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1. The popular press has recently reported on the significant increase in these ef-
forts. See Tax-Cuts-and-More to Woo Business, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 8,
1982, at 31. See also The Second War Between the States, Bus. WEEK, May 17, 1976, at
92; Lancaster, Competition by States to Lure Firms Turns into a Fierce Struggle, Wall St.
J., Dec. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
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dustrial base of many regions2 and an accelerated pace of capital
mobility.3 The public policy response has been largely market-ori-
ented, with state legislatures and city councils promoting the virtues of
their respective realms as sites for economic activity. Public officials
have attempted to provide a smorgasbord of public inducements aimed
at inspiring industry to locate in their particular area.4
A new and unfamiliar creature to emerge from this recent flurry of
economic development legislation is the publicly owned and operated
equity capital fund. Though government has long been in the business
of providing or subsidizing debt to private firms in the United States,5
public equity financing has appeared only recently. Since 1975 state
governments have instituted no fewer than twenty-one equity financing
programs,6 in the form of venture capital funds and royalty financing
programs, and at least six programs now exist at the local level.7 It has
2. See generally Rafuse, The State-Local Sector and the Economy: Overall Perform-
ance and Regional Disparities, in ESSAYS IN PUBLIC FINANCE AND FINANCIAL MAN-
AGEMENT: STATE AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 127 (Peterson & Spain eds. 1980).
Rafuse noted the:
[A]larm attached to evidence adduced by a number of studies of trends since 1970.
These data appear to show a dramatic acceleration in migration of people and jobs
from the Northeast in particular-and the Frostbelt in general-to the Sunbelt,
coupled with seriously lagging economic growth in the former region and a contin-
uing boom in the latter. One of the most important consequences of these trends, it
was argued, is the increasingly desperate fiscal condition of state and local
government.
Id. at 133.
3. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA, 47
(1982). See generally Millsbaugh, The Campaign for Plant Closing Laws in the U.S.: An
Assessment, 5 CORP. L. REV. 291 (1982).
4. For an excellent description of the types of programs being offered, see generally
Note, Problems With State Aid to New or Expanding Businesses, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
1019 (1985).
5. "Industrial development authorities are not new, the first such authority having
been set up in Mississippi in 1936." Basehore v. Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 433 Pa.
40, 46, 248 A.2d 212, 216 (1968).
6. In 1985, the authors, with Michael Sheehan, undertook an empirical study of the
structure of "public/private partnerships" in economic development programs for the
Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. See Fisher,
Sheehan & Colton, Public/Private Enterprise as an Economic Development Strategy
for States and Cities (1986) (unpublished study) [hereinafter Fisher, Sheehan & Colton].
7. The six local programs, and the years in which they were created, include: Erie
County, New York (1970); St. Paul, Minnesota (no new legislation); New Haven, Con-
necticut (1983); North Greenbush, New York (1984); Baltimore, Maryland (1985); and
Providence, Rhode Island (1980). Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-5.
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suddenly become acceptable for states and localities to own stock in
private firms.
Public sector promotion of business enterprise8 must be undertaken
within a complex web of statutory and constitutional constraints. Eq-
uity funding programs entail a grant of financial aid to the target indus-
try. This offer of government money, however, raises significant state
constitutional questions concerning the use of public funds.9 Moreover,
the federal antitrust implications of government involvement in private
enterprise are particularly unclear in light of a series of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions.' 0
The complexity of legal regulation becomes even greater when public
sector assistance flows from the local level. Because local governments
are not sovereign, I" courts do not accord their decisions the deference
given to state actions. Furthermore, local governments do not have the
inherent authority that resides in state governmental bodies.12
The purpose of this article is three-fold. First, it will develop a tax-
onomy of venture capital programs that local governments use. Sec-
ond, it will examine those programs in light of state constitutional
restrictions on the use of the public's finances.' 3 Finally, it will ex-
amine whether the federal antitrust immunity traditionally accorded
state actions' 4 is likely to extend to these programs.
I. PUBLIC INVESTMENT: ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
A number of mechanisms exist through which local governments
can invest in and promote business enterprises. At one extreme is the
most laissez-faire policy, whereby the government's role is limited to
8. For purposes of this article a "business enterprise" is defined as an entity that
produces a marketable good as opposed to providing traditional governmental services
such as social services, police and fire protection, roads, and education.
9. For a discussion of these constitutional restrictions in the area of publicly-owned
utilities, see Colton, Utility Financing of Energy Conservation: Can Loans Only Be Made
Through an Investor-Owned Utility?, 64 NEB. L. REV. 189 (1985).
10. See infra notes 138-77 and accompanying text.
11. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978).
12. W. VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 55 (2d ed. 1980).
13. See generally Comment, State Constitutional Limitations on a Municipality's
Power to Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to Individuals and Associations, 108 U. PA.
L. REV. 95, 97 (1959).
14. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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the provision of subsidies.15 At the other end of the continuum is out-
right public enterprise. 6 In between these two extremes lies a variety
of other types of institutional arrangements.17
A. Publicly Funded Equity Funding Institutions
The first government owned and operated equity financing institu-
tion created in the United States was the Connecticut Product Devel-
opment Corporation (CPDC), established in 1972." Three years later,
the Massachusetts legislature created the Massachusetts Community
Development Finance Corporation (CDFC) 9 and followed in 1978
with the Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation
(MTDC).20 The State of Maine, meanwhile, created the Maine Capital
Corporation in 1977, a for-profit privately managed venture capital
15. State and local governments occasionally provide direct grants of aid to private
firms. More often, however, subsidies are provided via the tax code or via the under-
pricing of governmental services. "Tax expenditures" are provisions in state or local tax
law that deviate from some standard, uniform, comprehensive tax and grant an exemp-
tion or tax preference resulting in a lower tax bill to some subset of taxpayers. There
are usually no preconditions for this type of subsidy beyond the eligibility criteria set
forth in the tax code. The public invests in the private sector, but claims no ownership
share, no voice in business decisions, and no financial return on its investment. Invest-
ment tax credits under a state corporate income tax and local property tax abatements
on new industrial construction are examples of such a subsidy. The free or below cost
provision of infrastructure such as water or sewer extensions is another means of subsi-
dizing economic activity. In this case, however, the public sector does have ownership
and control over the capital facilities themselves.
16. See generally A. WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS (1978); SHEPERD, PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE (1976).
17. Governments may also invest in productive economic activity by actual owner-
ship of physical assets rather than financial claims upon assets. Governments some-
times own land or facilities such as industrial parks, world trade centers, sports
stadiums, or business incubation centers that are in turn leased to private firms. In
many cases, facilities are built "on spec," with the public assuming any risk associated
with the uncertainty that the facility will stay fully rented. In these situations, the gov-
ernment may take a much more proactive and entrepreneurial role than is typically the
case with mere financial investments. The government is also in a position to exercise at
least some control over the private firm in negotiations over the terms of the lease. The
leasing of public facilities may entail subsidies, to the extent that the government fails to
cover costs or to earn a rate of return on its investment comparable to the market rate.
On the other hand, a lease could also have equity features if the lease payments are tied
to the firm's sales or profits.
18. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-32 to -47 (1983).
19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40F, §§ 1-5 (West 1983).
20. Id. ch. 40G, §§ 1-10.
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fund using state tax credits as an inducement to private investors.21
These four entities have served as models for most of the equity fund-
ing institutions created since that time.22
Two general types of publicly funded and managed equity funding
institutions exist: (1) state product development corporations, which
entail royalty financing, and (2) venture capital funds, which involve
the purchase of stock or an option to buy stock. As of January 1986
there were six state product development corporations,2 3 nine venture
capital funds at the state level (not including six privately managed
funds with some state financial participation), 24 and six venture capital
funds at the local level.25 Both types of endeavors are generally organ-
ized as quasi-public not-for-profit corporations.26 The primary objec-
tive of these organizations is the provision of risk capital to new or
growing businesses that have significant job-creation potential.27 They
21. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 950-54 (1964).
22. For a general discussion of state equity funding activities see U.S. SMALL BusI-
NESS ADMIN., STATE ACTIVITIES IN VENTURE CAPITAL, EARLY-STAGE FINANCING
AND SECONDARY MARKETS (1984) [hereinafter STATE AcTivmEs]; see also U.S.
SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN., STATE ACTIVITIES IN CAPITAL FORMATION: VENTURE
CAPITAL, WORKING CAPITAL, AND PUBLIC PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS (1985).
23. The states in which product development corporations exist, and the years in
which these corporations were created, include: Connecticut (1972); Iowa (1983); New
Mexico (1981); Ohio (1983); North Carolina (1983); and Louisiana (1984). Fisher,
Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-5.
24. The existing venture capital funds that are both publicly funded and publicly
managed, and the years in which they were created, include: the Massachusetts Com-
munity Development Finance Corporation (1975); the Massachusetts Technology De-
velopment Corporation (1978); the Alaska Resources Corporation (no longer in
operation) (1978); the Corporation for Innovation Development, New York Science and
Technology Foundation (1982); the Utah Technology Finance Corporation (1983); the
Louisiana Renewable Resources Foundation (1984); the Illinois Venture Investment
Fund (1985); the Wisconsin Community Development Finance Authority (1982); and
the New Hampshire Community Development Finance Authority (1983). Fisher,
Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-4.
25. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
26. Only the New Mexico, Ohio, and North Carolina efforts are state agencies. The
remaining endeavors are public or quasi-public corporations. Fisher, Sheehan & Col-
ton, supra note 6, at 5-4.
27. Compare the private sector analog in California, the Business and Industrial
Development Corporation (BIDCO). See generally Hansen, The Business and Indus-
trial Development Corporation: A Source of Capital for Small Solar Businesses, 2 SOLAR
L. REP. 941 (1981):
Unlike most traditional energy enterprises, solar energy and conservation busi-
nesses are likely to be small. As small businesses, they are likely to encounter
difficulties in their efforts to raise capital, a situation that frustrates the develop-
1987]
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are usually capitalized with federal grants and state or local govern-
ment appropriations.2" In a few instances, general obligation bond is-
sues have provided the funds.29
The initial financing for venture capital programs may, but need not,
come directly from government sources.30 Illinois and Pennsylvania,
for example, provide state appropriations to privately managed funds
established by the state,31 while the Port Authority of New York con-
tributes Authority revenues to a privately managed venture fund that it
established.32 Some publicly established venture capital funds, how-
ever, receive capital from private investors or from public employee
pension funds. Three states provide tax credits for contributions to
privately owned and managed venture capital funds initially set up by
the state.33 Finally, a number of states permit public employee pension
funds to invest in venture capital funds, while other states require simi-
lar investment.34 This pension fund participation occurs either by
purchasing stock in the venture capital endeavor or by becoming a lim-
ited partner.35
ment and expansion of this important sector of the energy industry. Despite the
rapid growth of the industry, the ability of these small firms to market their prod-
ucts successfully is impeded by the inability of present financial institutions to meet
their capital needs.
Id. at 941-42.
28. For a list of the endevors first capitalized with public appropriations, see Fisher,
Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-4.
29. The endeavors that have been capitalized with general obligations bonds include
the Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corporation, the Baltimore En-
terprise Development Fund (Baltimore Economic Development Corporation), and the
Connecticut Product Development Corporation. Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, supra note
6, at 5-4.
30. Notwithstanding this public funding, these endeavors are generally privately
owned and operated. The government plays a role only in chartering them, in provid-
ing state tax credits for contributions, or in making an investment or becoming a limited
partner. The states that have publicly funded and privately managed endeavors include
Illinois, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Maine, Montana, New York, and New Jersey. Fisher,
Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-4; note 24.
31. Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-4.
32. Id.
33. These states are Indiana, Maine, and Montana. Id.
34. For a general discussion of the role that state employee pension funds play in
providing venture capital, see STATE Acrivrrms, supra note 22, at 6-7. The U.S. Small
Business Administration (SBA) reports that pension funds with particular venture capi-
tal activity exist in Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Utah, and Washington.
35. The SBA reports that most pension funds limit their venture investment activity
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Venture capital funds provide financing for both new and small busi-
nesses3 6 in either start-up or early growth stages.37 The investment
generally takes the form of either a stock purchase or a warrant for the
future purchase of stock. A fund may also provide convertible debt.38
In addition to the two Massachusetts programs, state financed and
managed venture capital funds have existed in Alaska,3 9 Louisiana,"
New York,41 and Utah.42 Local venture funds exist in New Haven,
Connecticut; St. Paul, Minnesota; Baltimore, Maryland; Providence,
Rhode Island; and North Greenbush, New York.43
B. Government as Financial Intermediary
Local venture capital funds are a form of financial intermediary. 44 A
financial intermediary is an institution that pools the savings of many
to 5% of assets. Many funds typically invest in 10-year limited-partner venture capital
pools. STATE ACTIVITIES, supra note 22, at 6.
36. In contrast, product development corporations invest in the development and
marketing of new products. The return on the public's investment comes in the form of
product royalties, such as a percentage of product sales. Between 1981 and 1984, New
Mexico, Iowa, Ohio, North Carolina, and Louisiana set up product development corpo-
rations, modeled to some extent after the Connecticut Product Development Commis-
sion (CPDC).
37. Again, the California BIDCO proves to be a useful comparison:
Alcohol plants are an excellent example. Few lenders have the technical capacity
to make intelligent loan decisions to an applicant in this business. The technology
is simply too new and involves markets, economics, and government programs that
are changing too rapidly.... The next few decades may see small businesses in a
number of fields that, like alcohol fuels, will involve replicable loans. Solar pow-
ered irrigation systems, wind-powered pumping systems, and solar water heater
conversions are solar applications that can spawn thousands of small businesses
and energy facilities needing essentially similar financing.
Hansen, supra note 27, at 947.
38. Convertible debt is debt that is subject to conversion into shares of stock at a
rate specified in the loan agreement. It is not to be confused with a "warrant." See
infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
39. ALASKA STAT. §§ 30.13.010-.900 (1984).
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:9081-9093 (West Supp. 1986).
41. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 3100-3109 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
42. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-60-1 to -6 (1953).
43. Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-4.
44. For a detailed discussion of public financial intermediaries, see generally AMER-
ICAN PLANNING ASs'N, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS 63-68, 91-
117 (Barker ed. 1983) [hereinafter FINANCING DEVELOPMENT]. When a public equity
investment results in majority ownership and control, an outright public enterprise,
rather than a public financial intermediary, exists.
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individuals or businesses. The intermediary then invests those savings,
usually in some type of security. Local governments can create pub-
licly owned financial intermediaries by establishing a public corpora-
tion or public authority that is capitalized with federal grants, state or
local appropriations, bond sales, or private investments subsidized via a
state tax credit.45 The authority thus serves to pool the savings of the
general public46 or the savings of higher-income individuals who either
purchase tax exempt bonds or acquire shares in the authority. The
authority then invests the pooled savings in businesses through loans,
stock purchases, or other forms of debt or "near equity.",47
The form of local government financing will dictate both how the
government may participate in private sector decisionmaking and how
it will recoup its financial commitment. With pure debt financing the
public financial intermediary has no ownership or control. In contrast,
with straight equity financing the investor may or may not have rights
of ownership and control, depending upon the type of stock
purchased.48 With debt, the public recoups its investment from the
assisted industry through the firm's contractual obligation to repay the
principal and a fixed rate of interest according to a predetermined time-
table. The loan may be unsecured or it may be a mortgage. The distin-
guishing feature of equity, however, is that the investor does not have a
right to a predetermined return in the form of interest, but has only a
claim on a portion of profits.
Debt instruments can be made more like equity by incorporating
several features. The debt may be subordinated, thereby placing the
lender lower in line among creditors in the event of bankruptcy.49 The
debt may include a moratorium on payment of principal or interest or
45. North Greenbush, New York; Erie County, New York; and New Haven, Con-
necticut used federal grants to capitalize their local venture capital funds. Baltimore,
Maryland sold general obligation bonds. Local appropriations were made by St. Paul,
Minnesota, and New Haven. Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-4.
46. This is done by pooling a portion of their tax payments.
47. For a discussion of the ways in which a public financial intermediary can make
assistance available to private developers, see generally Fisher, The Role of the Public
Sector in Local Development Finance: Evaluating Alternative InstitutionalArrangements,
17 J. ECON. ISSUES 133 (1983).
48. Some state constitutional and statutory provisions, however, require that all
shares be voting shares. See, e.g., Comment, Non-Voting Shares-The Code and the
Constitution. 16 S.C.L. REv. 657 (1964); see also Note, Status of Nonvoting Stock in
Nebraska, 33 NEB. L. Rlv. 646 (1954).
49. See generally Calligar, Purposes and Uses of Subordination Agreements, 23 Bus.
LAW 33 (1967); Everett, Subordinated Debt-Nature, Objectives and Enforcement, 44
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both during the early years of the loan so that the firm is not burdened
with debt service during start-up and growth phases when it is unlikely
to be profitable.5" The debt may involve an actual forgiveness of inter-
est payments at first, perhaps contingent on profitability.5 1 Finally, the
rate of interest on the debt may not be fixed, but may instead be tied to
the profitability of the firm.
52
Frequently, public investments are a combination of both debt and
equity. In these instances, the investor provides a loan containing war-
rants.53 The warrant gives the lender a right to purchase a certain
number of equity shares at a specified price.54 Similarly, the debt may
be "convertible."" In this situation, it is subject to conversion into
shares of stock at a rate specified in the loan agreement. The advantage
of warrants, as opposed to convertible debt, is that warrants generally
are "detachable." They can be exercised or sold separately while the
debt obligation remains.5 6 If the market value of the firm's stock rises
above the warrant price, the investor may either exercise the warrant
price and then sell the stock, or he may sell the warrant itself, in either
case for a capital gain.
A final form of combining debt and equity is purchasing stock with a
"put option,"" whereby the investor can sell the stock back to the
B.U.L. REV. 487 (1964). Even in this case, the lender is still guaranteed payment ahead
of stockholders.
50. In a similar fashion, a company in such a case is not likely to be burdened with
dividend payments.
51. Interest rates that are conditioned in whole or in part upon corporate earnings
are often called "income obligations." See generally Comment, Bonds-Income
Bonds-Rights of Bondholders and Deductability of Interest for Federal Income Tax
Purposes, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1334 (1958).
52. This may be done through a combination of a fixed base rate and a higher rate
or rates that become effective when and if the firm achieves certain profit targets.
53. A warrant is, in effect, a "reverse tender option." Compare infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
54. In some instances, a warrant provides that rather than purchasing equity, the
holder may purchase additional bonds at the same price and coupon rate as the warrant.
J. PETERSEN & W. HOUGH, CREATIVE CAPITAL FINANCING FOR STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 73 (1983).
55. For general discussions of convertible debt, see Lewellen & Facette, Convertible
Debt Financing, 8 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 777 (1973); Brigham, An Analy-
sis of Convertible Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, 21 J. FIN. 35
(1966).
56. J. PETERSEN & W. HOUGH, supra note 54, at 73-76.
57. A "put option" is also sometimes referred to as a "tender option."
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company for a specified price. 8 Such a purchase gives the investor
"downside protection with upside potential."59 Even if the firm is not
doing well, this option guarantees the investor a minimum return
either in the form of interest or in the "put price" of the stock.6 0 If the
firm becomes highly profitable, the investor shares in those profits
through either ownership of the stock or warrants to purchase the
stock.
Given the variety of potential investment forms, it is difficult to de-
termine whether a local government has made an equity investment or
provided debt-financing to a private industry. An investment that
gives the investor unlimited opportunity for realizing gains through ap-
preciation in the price of a firm's stock might be considered an equity
investment.6 On the other hand, if the investor does not actually hold
stock at the time of the initial investment, the investment is, in reality,
debt that is often termed "near equity."62 Convertible debt and war-
rants, therefore, both represent "near equity." Loans with interest for-
giveness or interest rates tied to profitability could also be considered
"near equity" because the investor's return increases with profits. All
other forms of debt, even if unsecured, subordinated, or with deferred
interest or principal payments, are best defined simply as debt.63
58. There are two primary types of "put options:" (1) the "window put" (also
known as the European option); and (2) the "anniversary put" (also known as the
American option). A window put can be exercised only during a specified time in the
future; an anniversary put can be exercised periodically, for example once per year. J.
PETERSEN & W. HoUGH, supra note 54, at 41.
59. Because this protection is provided, the investor can expect to receive a lower
rate of return. Id.
60. This option guarantee is effective only in the event the firm does not fail.
61. Two additional forms of equity investment exist. First, the public entity may
enter into a royalty agreement with a private firm, in which case the public is entitled to
a fixed percentage of the sales of the firm's product. Royalty agreements are probably
best defined as equity positions. There is little or no "downside protection" because the
investor receives no return if there are no sales. On the other hand, there is unlimited
"upside potential" because royalties will increase in proportion to sales. Second, a pub-
lic entity may become a limited partner, usually in a real estate venture. As a limited
partner, the public does not exercise control over operations. Because the return on the
public's investment is a share of the profits, however, the investment is considered
equity.
62. These types of securities are also sometimes referred to as "equity securities."
For a discussion of "near equity" or "equity securities," see generally Loiseaux, Loans
or Capital Contributions to the Close Corporation, 38 REF. J. 4 (1964); FINANCING DE-
VELOPMENT, supra note 44, at 132.
63. See generally Johnson, Subordinated Debentures: Debt That Serves as Equity, 10
J. FIN. 1 (1955).
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A local government's financial investment in private industries may
take many forms, even when the local government chooses to act
through a government organized financial intermediary. Six local gov-
ernments have chosen to develop venture capital funds to provide fi-
nancial assistance to new and small businesses. The aid made available
through these funds may take the form of debt, equity, or "near eq-
uity," with different rights and responsibilities appertaining to each.
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF PUBLIC FINANCES
Fundamental precepts of state constitutional law place several re-
strictions on the use of public finances to participate in private enter-
prise. The grant of public funds for anything other than a "public
purpose" is prohibited." To avoid this restriction, the expenditure of
money must be used to address a social problem within the competence
of the legislature.6" If the grant meets the "public purpose" test, inci-
dental benefits to private entities are permissible,
6 6 even if substantial.67
In contrast, lending the state's credit to private parties is forbidden in
all circumstances. 6 The state's credit is implicated when the general
64. The "public purpose" constitutional restriction came as a result of the overex-
tension of public commitments in the mid-nineteenth century. Public inducements to
private railroads were made in the form of government loans, bond issuances, and guar-
antees of credit. See City of Clovis v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 49 N.M. 270, 276,
161 P.2d 878, 881-82 (1945) (quoting Murphy v. Dever, 320 Ill. 186, 188-89, 150 N.E.
663, 663-64 (1926)); cf. Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 334, 438 P.2d 725,
727 (1968); Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926).
65. C.D. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 25.07 (1981) (cita-
tions omitted).
66. See, e.g., Anderson v. McCann, 124 N.H. 249, 251,469 A.2d 1311, 1313 (1983);
contra Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth. 422 Pa. 317, 338, 221 A.2d 138, 150 (1966)
("This net increment to the public, in light of the magnitude of the garage project and
the substantial benefits accruing to [the public] therefrom, is not sufficient to warrant
the public involvement here proposed.").
67. How substantial is a fluid concept at best:
A slide rule definition to determine public purpose for all time cannot be formu-
lated; the concept expands with the population, economy, scientific knowledge, and
changing conditions. As people are brought closer together in congested areas, the
public welfare requires governmental operation of facilities which were once con-
sidered exclusively private enterprises. . ., and necessitates the expenditure of tax
funds for purposes which, in an earlier day, were not classified as public. Often
public and private interests are so commingled that it is difficult to determine
which predominates.
Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745,
750 (1968).
68. See e.g., State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council, 9 Ohio St. 3d 126, 128, 459 N.E.2d
1987]
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taxing power is used as bond security69 or when the state acts as a
guarantor or surety for privately incurred debt."0 The intent of this
constitutional restriction is to proscribe lending the state's credit to pri-
vate parties, whether or not for a "public purpose."7 1
The various means by which local governments participate in pro-
moting business enterprise involve the grant of public funds or the loan
of public credit. This article will examine those means; it will not ex-
amine the use of eminent domain. The analysis will evaluate the his-
toric development of industrial inducement programs to gain insight
into the probable treatment of contemporary equity investment
programs.
A. The Expenditure of Public Funds
Financial participation in private industry72 is generally undertaken
to alleviate economic dislocation. The relief of unemployment and re-
lated economic ills quite easily satisfy judicial inquiry into whether the
expenditures serve a "public purpose." Courts look to the economic
impact of a government supported industrial project to determine
whether or not a "public purpose" exists to sustain it.73 Typical of
judicial approval of these programs is the statement that the purpose of
the public investment is "to relieve an economic condition affecting the
welfare of the people of the entire parish."7 4
Lawsuits challenging local industrial development projects sup-
208, 209-210 (1984). (section 6, art. VIII of the Ohio Constitution "forbids the union of
public and private capital or credit in any enterprise whatever").
69. The constitutional restriction serves largely to protect the state treasuries from
bond defaults by private corporations. See Colton, supra note 9, at 194 nn.34-35.
70. See eg., State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 29, 72 N.W.2d 577, 584
(1955); Button v. Day, 203 Va. 687, 127 S.E.2d 122 (1962); State ex rel O'Connell v.
Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 2 Wash. App. 366, 469 P.2d 922 (1970) rev'd, 79 Wash. 2d 237,
484 P.2d 393 (1971).
71. Comment, State Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting the Loaning of Credit to
Private Enterprise-A Suggested Analysis, 41 U. CoLo. L. REV. 135, 139-40 (1969); but
see Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing for Industrial Development, 70
YALE L.J. 789, 794 (1961).
72. This public participation will sometimes be referred to as a public inducement
within this article. These programs, however, are in contrast to inducement programs
such as tax abatements.
73. DeArmond v. Alaska State Dev. Corp., 376 P.2d 717 (Alaska 1962); Roan v.
Connecticut Indus. Bldg. Comm'n, 150 Conn. 333, 189 A.2d 399 (1963).
74. Miller v. Police Jury, 226 La. 8, 19, 74 So. 2d 394, 398 (1954).
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ported with public funds generally fail.75 The prevailing judicial atti-
tude is reflected in the Mississippi Supreme Court decision in Albritton
v. City of Winona.7 6 That 1938 decision dismissed a "public purpose"
challenge and held that "the relief of unemployment, and the promo-
tion of agriculture and industry are undoubtedly proper governmental
purposes, [and] are so recognized everywhere and by all." 7 7 The two
most common rationales used to justify industrial assistance are the
creation of jobs, known as the "multiplier effect," and the diversifica-
tion of a community's economic base.7 8 Several courts upholding pub-
lic inducement programs have expressly referred to the multiplier effect
of industrial jobs.7 9
The propriety of spending public funds on private enterprise, how-
ever, is not settled. One commentator criticized the quick approval
often given industrial financing plans.8" The general judicially-noticed
belief that "industrialization usually results in economic betterment,"
the commentator said, is perhaps "based too much on supposition." A
more rationale inquiry, he continued, would be "to examine each possi-
ble consequence of the project in detail." Such an inquiry would allow
an opportunity to show in specific cases that the court's intimation was
wrong.
This criticism is well-based. For industrial incentive packages to
cure local economic ills, the multiplier effect upon income and property
values must increase the tax base in order to adequately finance the
infrastructure required to support the new industry.8 1 The commu-
nity's responsibility to provide municipal services such as sewers,
75. Note, supra note 71, at 791 n.14; see also Wright v. City of Palmer, 468 P.2d 326
(Alaska 1970); Basehore v. Hampden Ind. Dev. Auth., 433 Pa. 40, 67, 248 A.2d 212,
225 (1968). See generally Mumford, The Past, Present and Future of Industrial Develop-
ment Bonds, 1 URB. LAW. 147 (1969). One leading treatise on local government law
notes that "courts are increasingly inclined to sustain a wide variety of borrowing ar-
rangements that further public objectives." C.D. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, supra note
65, § 25.07.
76. 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938).
77. 181 Miss. at 97-98, 178 So. at 804.
78. DeArmond v. Alaska State Dev. Corp., 376 P.2d 717 (Alaska 1962); Roan v.
Connecticut Indus. Bldg. Comm'n, 150 Conn. 333, 189 A.2d 399 (1963).
79. See, e.g., City of Gaylord v. Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich. 273, 144 N.W. 2d
460 (1966); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 287 Minn. 357, 178 N.W. 2d 594 (1970); State
ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W. 2d 784 (1973).
80. Note, supra note 71, at 798.
81. Local decisionmakers are beginning to recognize the costs of providing addi-
tional infrastructure. For an excellent discussion of innovative methods of financing
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water, streets, and public buildings must still be met, especially with
the increased demand for these services from the new industry. Be-
cause the city will often forego the opportunity to tax the new industry,
the funds for maintaining public services must instead be collected
from property taxes and other local option taxes on pre-existing resi-
dents and businesses.
It is not clear that these additional burdens can be met through mul-
tiplier effect benefits. The use of multiplier analysis has been severely
criticized on a technical basis, particularly at the local level where local
policymakers run into considerable difficulty utilizing the various mul-
tiplier models to address specific local situations.82 One group of econ-
omists, attempting to develop a more reliable multiplier model, noted:
Efforts to estimate accurately the income multipliers, employment
multipliers, or both for small areas, (counties, municipalities, or
multicounty planning and development districts), have been con-
strained for a number of reasons. Particular difficulty has been
encountered in utilizing sophisticated techniques such as input-
output and economic models because of data limitations, comput-
ing facility requirements, and the like.83
Another group of economists concluded that the degree of confidence
that can be placed on the results of many impact assessments is ques-
tionable, "since there are many areas of uncertainty that may affect the
quality of the results."84 In addition, the economists found that "tech-
nical sophistication is no guarantee of the reliability of results ...."'I
Contemporary courts are split as to whether a factual analysis into
these criticized areas is a proper subject for judicial inquiry. Some
courts specifically eschew any examination of the factual foundation
underlying claims of a public purpose. The Connecticut Supreme
Court, for example, said it would not hold an industrial inducement
program unconstitutional "simply because the petitioners' economic
such development, see Zom, Financing Infrastructure to Promote Economic Develop-
ment in the East North Central Region, GOV'T FIN. REV. Apr. 1986, at 29.
82. Policymakers have also often failed to realize that "usual applications of base
theory involve rather heroic assumptions." Smith, Heckbart & Van Veen, A Modified
Regression Base Multiplier Model, GROWTH & CHANGE, July 1981, at 18.
83. Id. at 17.
84. Bartels, Nichols & Dunn, Estimating the Impact of Regional Policy, 3 RE-
GIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 35 (1982).
85. Id.
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forecasts differ from those of the legislature.",86 The Maine Supreme
Court agreed,8 7 rejecting the use of any analysis that depends on an
examination of whether a particular project would actually result in
added income or employment. 88 Constitutional limitations are satis-
fied, the Maine court held, if the legislative purpose is appropriate. 89
Testimony, it continued, that might prove an incorrect calculation of
benefits does not detract from an expressed legislative intent.9"
In contrast, a number of state courts have engaged in a specific in-
quiry into the propriety of spending public funds on private enterprise.
In 1954 the New Hampshire Supreme Court was called upon to review
an urban redevelopment project.9 ' The court said that though the leg-
islative findings of a public purpose were "entitled to weight," they had
"no magical quality to make valid that which is invalid." 92 Moreover,
several courts have rejected the notion that new or expanding business
per se fulfills the dictates of the "public purpose" doctrine. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court, for example, upheld a municipal financing
scheme for one industrial plant, finding that it addressed the public
need for new jobs.9 3 The same court, however, had previously held a
financing scheme unconstitutional because the need for additional eco-
nomic development in the area was not demonstrated.94 Similarly, an
early Mississippi Supreme Court decision found a municipal financing
scheme lacking a public purpose because the economic and social justi-
86. Wilson v. Connecticut Prod. Dev. Corp., 167 Conn. 111, 118, 355 A.2d 72, 76
(1974).
87. Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 17 (Me. 1983).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 24-26.
90. In general, all other things equal, an industrial development program supported
by appropriate legislative findings of a "public purpose" tends to be immune from suc-
cessful judicial attack. The "emerging trend of decision" is to accord a legislative enact-
ment authorizing borrowing "virtually dispositive weight" on whether the public benefit
involved is sufficient to meet the public purpose requirement. C.D. SANDS & M.
LIBONATI, supra note 65, § 25.06. Even critics of the use of public monies for industrial
development note that although what constitutes a public purpose "is primarily a judi-
cial question ... the courts have been disposed to give great weight to the legislative
determination." Comment, supra note 71, at 150 (quoting Milheim v. MofFat Tunnel
Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1922)).
91. Valishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 (1954).
92. Id. at 165, 106 A. 2d at 573.
93. McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1958).
94. Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 275 S.W. 29 (1925); see also Manning v. Fiscal
Court, 405 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1966).
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fications for the challenged plan were missing." A later decision by
that same court found the justifications for a different project ade-
quately established.
9 6
Courts that are willing to examine the factual foundation of a pro-
posed project specifically evaluate the economic impacts of these
projects to determine whether or not a public purpose exists to sustain
them.97 A South Carolina Supreme Court decision typifies this in-
quiry. The court held, in State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley,98 that authori-
zation of public bonds for the promotion of certain computer and office
facilities and shopping centers was unconstitutional.99 Commercial
projects, the court said, do not provide many new jobs. The claim of a
"public purpose" based on economic factors, the court concluded, thus
had no basis."°
The Florida Supreme Court first explicitly rejected, on legal princi-
ple, the notion that a "public purpose" is established by showing gen-
eral economic benefits.1"' In 1983 the Florida court invalidated
industrial obligation bonds that were issued to support a new 45,000
square foot facility for two broadcast studios and related offices.10 2
The proposed project, the court found, would create a total of twenty-
five jobs. The court reiterated the standard test for whether a "public
purpose" exists, holding that municipal financing was appropriate
"where the private benefit was strictly incidental to a paramount public
purpose."1 1 3 It continued, however, by placing an important caveat on
this doctrine. A "broad general public purpose," the court said, "will
not constitutionally sustain a project that in terms of direct, actual use,
95. Carothers v. Town of Booneville, 169 Miss. 511, 153 So. 670 (1934).
96. Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 109, 178 So. 799, 809, appeal dis-
missed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938).
97. See supra notes 78-79, 93-96 and accompanying texts.
98. 276 S.C. 323, 278 S.E.2d 612 (1981).
99. Id. at 332, 278 S.E.2d at 617; but see Marshall Field & Co. v. Village of South
Barrington, 92 Ill. App. 3d 360, 415 N.E.2d 1277 (1981); State ex rel. Ohio County
Comm'n v. Samol, 165 W. Va. 714, 720, 275 S.E.2d, 2, 5 (1980).
100. 276 S.C. at 332, 278 S.E.2d at 617. According to one justice of the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, a clear distinction exists between industrial projects and commer-
cial endeavors in this regard. 165 W. Va. at 721, 275 S.E.2d at 6.
101. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth. v. State, 427 So.2d 174, 179 (Fla. 1983); but
see State v. Housing Fin. Auth., 376 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 1979); Jordan v. Woodward, 40
Maine 317, 323-24 (1855).
102. 427 So.2d at 179.
103. Id. at 176.
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is purely a private enterprise."" ° The court found:
Every new business, manufacturing plant, or industrial plant
which may be established in a municipality will be of some benefit
to the municipality. Incidental benefits accruing to the public
from the establishment of some private enterprise [are] not suffi-
cient to make the establishment of such enterprise a public
purpose. 105
In a subsequent Florida case the court adhered to the same general
principle, though the outcome was different on the facts: "[E]conomic
stimulation is not a sufficient public benefit to justify using public bond
proceeds primarily to aid a private business."
10 6
The State of Washington has been particularly adverse to the notion
that general economic benefits will justify the use of public funds. In
Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of the Port of Longview1 "7 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of legislation that
sought to give port districts authority to make pollution control facili-
ties available to nonpublic entities."08 The port districts issued bonds
"sufficient to cover the cost of acquisition, construction, and installa-
tion of the pollution control facility on property of the private corpora-
tion." °' Supporters of the bond argued that "ultimately the local
governments are actually aided by virtue of an increased ad valorem
tax base and increased local payroll through increased local employ-
ment." o The Washington court rejected this argument, stating that
its function "is not to weigh the economic impact of the transactions.
The loan of money or credit by a municipality to a private corporation
is a violation of our state constitution regardless of whether or not it
serves a laudable public purpose." ''
104. Id. at 179.
105. Id. (quoting State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779, 784 (Fla. 1952);
Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So.2d 663, 669 (Fla. 1952)).
106. Linscott v. Orange County Indus. Dev. Auth., 443 So.2d 97, 103 (Fla. 1983)
(Boyd J., dissenting).
107. Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of the Port of Longview, 85 Wash. 2d 216, 527
P.2d 263 (1974), amended, 533 P.2d 128 (1975).
108. Id. at 218, 527 P.2d at 264.
109. Id. at 220, 527 P.2d at 265. Though not general obligation bonds, the bonds in
controversy were issued in the name of the city, and the face of the bond declared that it
was the obligation of the issuing municipality. Id. at 221, 527 P.2d at 265.
110. Id. at 230, 527 P.2d at 270.
111. Id. at 231, 527 P.2d at 271; see also Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d
804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978) ("[T]he expected receipt of future public benefits cannot serve
to validate an otherwise unconstitutional loan of credit.").
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Substantial academic commentary argues that to accept general eco-
nomic benefits as sufficient to establish a public purpose "ignores the
lessons of the railroads."' I 12 One commentator queried whether public
officials could politically forego assistance to an industry that is not
economically sound."1 3 All types of officials can get carried away with
the prospects of gain:
We know the history of these municipal and county bonds-how
the legislature, yielding to popular excitement about railroads, au-
thorized their issue; how grand juries, and county commissioners,
and city officers, were molded to the purposes of speculators; how
recklessly railroad officers abused the overwrought confidence of
the public, and what burdens of debt and taxation have resulted to
the people.
1 14
The same situation may currently be developing. One commentator
recently noted, for example, that "even though the recession and Rea-
gan's 'new Federalism' shift of programs to the state level have put
more of a burden on state treasuries than ever before, states continue to
increase business tax breaks." ' 5 It is difficult to assess the financial
consequences of these public inducement programs. 1 6 States and cit-
ies seldom know precisely what their incentives cost the public. In
New York City, for example, a public official discovered that "no relia-
ble estimates of annual [property tax] exemption commitments are
available."1 1
7
112. Lawrence, Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Participation in Down-
town Development Projects, 35 VAND. L. Rtv. 277, 310 (1982).
113. Tilden, Public Inducements for Industrial Location: A Lesson From Massachu-
setts, 18 ME. L. Rav. 1, 46-47 (1966).
114. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Lawrence County, 37 Pa. 353, 358 (1860); see also
People ex reL Detroit & Howell R.R. v. Township Bd., 20 Mich. 452, 487 (1870).
115. Rosenburg, States at War, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 3, 1983, at 20.
116. The cost of venture capital funds is tied to their success in assisting the crea-
tion of new firms. There is, however, a sharp contrast in the ability of the different
venture capital endeavors to do this. The Massachusetts Community Development Fi-
nance Corporation (CDFC) made loans and equity investments in 23 firms from July
1978 to July 1982. These loans and equity investments reached 5.1 million dollars. By
1985 only six of those firms survived and the CDFC lost 4 million dollars in loans or
stock investment. In contrast, the Massachusetts Technology Development Corpora-
tion (MTDC) invested 6.7 million dollars in 33 corporations from June 1979 to June
1985. Only two of those firms have failed. Through 1984 the MTDC investments of 5.7
million dollars leveraged 51 million dollars of private capital, a ratio of about 9:1.
Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, supra note 6, at 5-7 to 5-13.
117. Cho & Schuermann, A Decision Model for Regional Industrial Recruitment
and Development, 10 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 259, 260 (1980).
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Public industrial inducement programs are causing an expanding
amount of state resources to be poured into new or expanding busi-
nesses.118 As more states provide financial assistance and inducements
to businesses, each state discovers that it must increase the amount it
provides in its own programs to remain competitive.119 The Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that a publicly financed industrial inducement
program met the "public purpose" test because that state would lose its
competitiveness with surrounding states without the assistance.120
State and local programs providing public assistance to new or ex-
panding industries generally entail the provision of various types of fi-
nancial aid. The expenditure of public funds for private endeavors,
however, is constitutionally permissible only if the endeavor is for a
"public purpose." The trend of courts today is to uphold the notion
that projects resulting in economic development for an area constitute
a "public purpose." Many courts, in better reasoned decisions, have
inquired into the factual basis for a declaration of whether a "public
purpose" exists. Policymakers who support efforts involving public in-
vestment in business enterprises must, therefore, be prepared to present
a convincing demonstration of the public benefits to be gained from
those programs.
B. Lending the Public Credit
State constitutional provisions proscribe lending the state's credit to
private parties for any purpose. 21 Unlike the expenditure of public
funds, the constitutional lending ban does not turn on whether a "pub-
lic purpose" is implicated in the financing scheme.1 22 The purpose of
the ban is to protect the public treasury from the types of credit over-
118. Note, Problems With State Aid to New or Expanding Businesses, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1019, 1025 (1985).
119. This observation was made as early as 1938: "[T]he economic implications of
the Mississippi Industrial Plan are of considerable moment. For this statute is the latest
weapon in a new War between the States,-a bitter competition for the attraction and
establishment of industry." Note, Municipal Subsidies and the Industrialization of the
South, 47 YALE L.3. 1412, 1415 (1938).
120. City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 287 Minn. 357, 368, 178 N.W.2d 594, 601 (1970).
121. See generally J. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE
DEBT (1963); Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing:
An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 265 (1963).
122. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; but see E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39.30 (3d ed. 1983). Dyche v. City of London, 288
S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956).
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extensions that plagued state and local governments during the expan-
sion of railroads in the mid- and late-nineteenth century. 1
23
Several indices guide whether the credit of the state has been given
or loaned in aid of a private interest. First, there must be some evi-
dence of indebtedness incurred on the part of the public body.'24
Bonds are generally issued in the name of the governmental entity for
the ultimate use of a private developer. Second, the indebtedness must
be a legal obligation of the government, whereby the governmental en-
tity is held to be a payer of the indebtedness.125
Recently developed legal inventions have served to eliminate most of
the efficacy of this constitutional restriction. The revenue bond is per-
haps the primary mechanism through which governments may raise
funds to make available to private developers.126 The issuance of reve-
nue bonds pledges the proceeds of a designated stream of funds other
than tax dollars as security for debt repayment.' 27 The bondholder
bears the risk that funds dedicated to the repayment of revenue bonds
will be insufficient to pay principal and interest. 2 ' In the event of such
an insufficiency governmental taxing powers are not implicated. In-
deed, revenue bonds often expressly disclaim the obligation of the issu-
ing government to ensure prompt and complete payment. 129 In
industrial assistance programs, revenue bonds are frequently secured
through pledges of the revenue generated by the assisted project. Reve-
nue bonds issued to raise capital for these programs do not constitute a
123. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; but see Wright v. City of Palmer,
468 P.2d 326, 330 n.11 (Alaska 1970). The court in Wright found: "Long-run eco-
nomic and social changes are ever present sources of financial risk. Population shifts or
widespread economic recession may render unworkable fiscal policies that were once
considered sound. These risks, however, are inevitable concommitants of public deci-
sionmaking." Id.
124. State ex rel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 226, 82 N.W.2d 269, 272
(1957).
125. Id.
126. By 1979 revenue bonds accounted for 72% of all new long-term municipal
bond issues. PUBLIC SECURITIES Ass'N, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 16
(1981) [hereinafter BOND FUNDAMENTALS].
127. Sources of funds may include user fees, tolls, concessions, municipal lease-back
payments, or industrial lease payments. Id. at 19-20.
128. Fisher, Forbes & Petersen, Risk and Return in the Choice of Revenue Bond
Financing, in J. PETERSEN & W. HOUGH, supra note 4, at 139, 140-41.
129. See, e.g., Miles v. City of Eugene, 252 Or. 528, 531-32, 451 P.2d 59, 61 (1969);
State ex reL Ohio County Comm'n v. Samol, 165 W. Va. 714, 720, 275 S.E.2d 2, 5
(1980).
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debt, liability, or general obligation of the state, and thus do not run
afoul of constitutional prohibitions. 3 '
Another means of bypassing constitutional restrictions involves the
credit of a public or quasi-public corporation, which is considered dis-
tinct from the credit of the state. 3 ' These corporations often take the
form of "public authorities," and are therefore considered independent
instrumentalities and not political subdivisions.1 32 There are, however,
a number of legal prerequisites to the formation of a public authority.
The primary requirement is that independence must be maintained
from the originating governmental entity. A public authority must
function independently and be distinct from its creator.133 An author-
ity must meaningfully be regarded as an additional and separate unit of
government and not as a mere appendage of the creating govern-
ment.13 4 Moreover, public authorities are generally not supported by
general taxing revenues, but instead derive their support from user fees
and compensation paid for the provision of their services.1 35 As a re-
sult of these attributes, debt incurred by a public authority is not con-
sidered public credit. In the event that financing is made available to
private developers, it is not considered to be "credit of the state" that
might conflict with constitutional provisions.
Finally, public assistance to industrial developers can be structured
so that the assistance does not constitute a loan or gift of the public
credit. In the instance in which mutual consideration is exchanged, no
130. "[T]he rule is well established that the issuance of revenue bonds to finance a
public project ...does not constitute a lending of credit . . . ." Miller v. City of
Owensboro, 343 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
131. People v. Chicago Transit Auth., 392 Ill. 77, 64 N.E.2d 4 (1945); Cleveland v.
City of Detroit, 322 Mich. 172, 33 N.W.2d 747 (1948).
132. See Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976);
Opinion of the Justices, 294 Ala. 571, 319 So.2d 699 (1975).
133. Bloomfield Village Drain Dist. v. Keefe, 119 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 649 (1941); Water Works Bd. v. City of Mobile, 253 Ala. 158,43 So.2d
409 (1949); Kennelly v. Kent County Water Auth., 79 R.I. 376, 89 A.2d 188 (1952).
134. North Miami Beach Water Bd. v. Gollin, 171 So.2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Parking Auth., 40 N.J. 227, 191 A.2d 169 (1963); Opin-
ion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49 So.2d 175 (1950).
135. Fetner, Public Power and Professional Responsibility: Julius Henry Cohen and
the Origins of the Public Authority, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 15 (1977); Quirk & Wein, A
Short Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL
L. REV. 521 (1971).
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loan of credit is implicated.'16 Instead, in these situations, the indus-
trial developer and the agency providing the assistance create a binding
contract, with mutual covenants consented to by each party. When a
genuine exchange of concrete, specific, measurable consideration has
occurred, there is no lending of money or credit. 137
State constitutional provisions prohibit, under any circumstances,
lending the credit of the state to private entities. Unlike the expendi-
ture of public funds, whether or not the loan serves a "public purpose"
is neither a relevant nor a determinative consideration in ascertaining
the constitutional validity of the grant of state credit. This state consti-
tutional restriction has lost most of its efficacy in recent years. New
legal inventions allow for the commitment of public credit without this
credit being classified as that "of the state." The rise of the public
authority, the utilization of revenue bonds, and the making of bilateral
contracts all permit private developers to take advantage of credit ob-
tained through the public sector.
The constitutional restrictions on the extension of public credit,
therefore, do not pose serious obstacles to state venture capital funds.
These funds typically provide equity capital and therefore do not impli-
cate state debt restrictions. Notably, all but three states have created
separate public corporation or authorities to administer the distribu-
tion of state-provided venture capital. As a result, venture capital
funds will not likely run afoul of prohibitions on lending the state's
credit.
III. LocAL IMMUNITY FROM FEDERAL ANTITRUST LIMITATIONS
Local governments that provide financial assistance to select indus-
tries must also recognize the potential federal antitrust implications of
their actions. In 1978 the United States Supreme Court eliminated lo-
cal governmental immunity from federal antitrust limitations. In the
seminal case City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Company,138
the Court held that the immunity that vests in state government ac-
tions does not extend to local governments unless such governments
act pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state
136. Cremer v. Peoria Hous. Auth., 399 Ill. 579, 593-94, 78 N.E.2d 276, 284 (1948);
Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1977).
137. Washington Natural Gas v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wash. 2d 94, 103-04,
459 P.2d 633, 639 (1969).
138. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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policy.'39 In 1982 the Supreme Court, in Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder,140 expanded the potential for local liability when
it held that immunity does not extend to cities operating under home
rule powers. 141
Congress recently eliminated most of the financial consequences that
Lafayette, Boulder, and their progeny created for local governments. 142
In enacting the Federal Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,143
Congress exempted local governments from the imposition of mone-
tary damage (treble or otherwise) and from the payment of litigation
costs of successful antitrust claimants.'" The federal legislation does,
however, still allow for the grant of injunctive relief. 145 Congress noted
that there is a need to subject local governments to some antitrust re-
strictions: "If Congress were confident that the actions of local govern-
ments and their officials were always in the public interest or would
never work unnecessary anticompetitive injury, it could simply exclude
them from the application of the antitrust laws entirely. The record
does not support such action at this time."
146
As under prior legislation, private challenges to a local government's
actions must, even without local immunity, allege and prove the an-
ticompetitive impacts of an industrial assistance program.147 These ac-
tivities are most likely to conflict with federal antitrust policy codified
in the Clayton Act' 48 and the Sherman Act.14 9 The Clayton Act gov-
erns the actions of persons engaged in interstate commerce. Under the
139. This test originated in the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 362 (1977).
140. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
141. Id. at 52.
142. See generally Henrick, The Federal Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984
and the 1985 Amendments to the Florida Antitrust Act: A Survey and Analysis of Florida
Local Government Antitrust Vulnerability, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 77 (1985).
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. III 1985).
144. Id. § 36.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
146. H.R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4619.
147. See generally Sharpe, Unfair Competition by Public Support of Private Enter-
prises, 95 L.Q. REv. 205 (1979). The "public purpose" doctrine was created largely to
protect private enterprise from unfair competition by state-supported commercial en-
deavors. See, e.g., Almond v. Day, 199 Va. 1, 97 S.E.2d 824 (1957).
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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terms of the statute, specific acts are deemed anticompetitive and are
prohibited. Among the proscribed activities are tying arrangements,'
exclusive dealing arrangements,' 51 and requirements contracts. 152 The
Sherman Act is divided into two important proscriptions. Section 1
bans every unreasonable "contract, combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade."' 53 Section 2 prohibits the acts of monopolization or
attempted monopolization. 15
4
A. The Recent Judicial Trend
Local government immunity from antitrust liability initially flowed
from creation of a state action exemption in the 1942 United States
Supreme Court decision Parker v. Brown.'55 In Parker the Court ob-
served that the Sherman Antitrust Act makes no mention of states, as
such. Throughout the evolution of antitrust legislation, the Court said
that it presumed that congressional intent was to regulate only the con-
duct of private parties.' 56
Local government antitrust liability first appeared possible with the
Supreme Court's Lafayette decision. 157  In Lafayette the Supreme
Court reviewed the actions of municipally-owned public utility compa-
nies. These utilities had refused to make electricity available outside
their city limits to customers who did not also buy gas and water ser-
vice. Louisiana Power & Light claimed the Clayton Act prohibited
this practice as a "tying arrangement."'15 8 The municipal utilities
claimed state action immunity, but the Supreme Court rejected that
argument. The Court held that for immunity to attach to local activi-
ties, the actions must "reflect," "implement," or be done "pursuant to"
a "clearly articulated and affrmatively expressed" state policy. 159
Not surprisingly, substantial conflict developed over precisely what
direction a local government must receive from the state in order to
150. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies § 112 (1971 & Supp. 1986).
151. Id. § 118.
152. Id. § 115.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
154. Id. §2.
155. 317 U.S. 341 (1942).
156. Id. at 350-52.
157. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of this case.
158. 435 U.S. at 408.
159. Id. at 410.
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meet this Lafayette requirement. Some courts held, for example, that
state legislation must set out the exact actions of the city being chal-
lenged,"6° while others held that only the policy and not the means
must be identified. 161 Some courts held that local government actions
must be mandated by the state,162 while others held that immunity
arose if the local action was a foreseeable consequence of the state's
policy. 163 Finally, some courts held that the state must actively super-
vise any anticompetitive actions of a local government," 6 while others
found no such supervision necessary.' 65 Substantial litigation, there-
fore, has been devoted to further refinement of the requirements set
forth in Lafayette.
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject came
in the 1985 decision Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.'66 In Town
of Hallie the Court considered a challenge to the city's refusal to pro-
vide sewage treatment services to adjacent unincorporated townships
unless those townships agreed to be annexed by the community and to
use the city's sewage collection and transportation services. The town-
ships argued that the city's requirements were an attempt to gain a
monopoly prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act.167 The city
claimed state action immunity under the Parker doctrine. The Court
held that municipal action obtained immunity under the Parker doc-
160. Brontel Ltd. v. City of New York, 571 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd
sub nom. Rent Control Memorial Corp. v. City of New York, 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 248 (1984); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); City
of North Olmstead v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 722 F.2d 1284 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.
1981).
161. Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1984); Serlin Wine & Spirit
Merchants, Inc. v. Healy, 512 F. Supp. 936 (D. Conn.), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Divi-
sion of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1981).
162. Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v.
Southern Motor Carriers, 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
163. Highfield Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 488 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Md.
1980); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S.
Ct. 1713 (1985).
164. Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch v. SIDA of Hawaii, 562 F. Supp. 712 (D. Haw.
1983); Ronwin v. State Bar, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 358 (1984).
165. Ajax Aluminum v. Goodwill Industries, 564 F. Supp. 628 (W.D. Mich. 1983);
Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985).
166. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
167. Id. at 1716.
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trine if it was a foreseeable result of state legislation.16 The Court said
that the legislature need not specifically provide for the challenged mu-
nicipal acts, as long as the local government actions were among the
kind of action contemplated. Finally, the Court held that municipal
actions need not be under the state's direct supervision because they
are constrained by the "clearly articulated state policy" first discussed
in Lafayette.1 69
In spite of Town of Hallie, it is clear that state legislatures cannot
simply exempt local governments from the requirements and regula-
tions of federal antitrust statutes. Instead, federal courts rule that
when the state sovereign, operating through a municipal government in
appropriately confined instances, determines that it is in the interest of
the state to displace competition, the federal antitrust laws do not serve
to prohibit such displacement. This limitation on state action immu-
nity inhered in the Parker exemption from its inception. 170 The state,
the Court said in Town of Halie, "may not validate a municipality's
anticompetitive conduct simply by declaring it to be lawful."1 7' The
Court favorably noted Lafayette's assertion that municipal govern-
ments would not be permitted to use "purely parochial interests to dis-
rupt the Nation's free market goals." 17 2
These cases underscore the need for local governments, facing chal-
lenges to public sector assistance for private sector developers, to be
careful of the public policy upon which they rely as a justification for
their actions. The Parker state action treatment creates two threshold
requirements for local governments. First, the public policy must in-
volve a decision to displace competition with some sort of alternative
state scheme.1 73  This displacement of competition may take many
forms. Regulation, for example, may be substituted for competitive
forces when a local government places conditions on the extension of
utility services. Government price-fixing may take precedent over
what would otherwise be market-determined rates. Publicly provided
168. Id. at 1718.
169. Id. at 1721.
170. Parker held that immunity applied only to "conduct engaged in as an act of
government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." Lafayette, 435 U.S.
at 413.
171. 105 S. Ct. at 1716.
172. Id. at 1717.
173. 435 U.S. at 413.
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monopoly service, such as ambulance service, may be substituted for
competing private sector alternatives. Legitimate questions may be
raised as to whether programs of providing public assistance for private
industries fall within this state determination of a need to displace com-
petition with regulation or monopoly service.
Second, the displacement of competition by local public sector alter-
natives must result in the promotion of a statewide public policy.' 74
Local economic development, in other words, that is not part and par-
cel of a statewide scheme will not pull otherwise anticompetitive activi-
ties within the state action antitrust exemption. Supportive of this
view, the Lafayette Court expressed hostility towards the promotion of
merely local policies, referring to them on more than one occasion as
"parochial interests."' 75 The Court expressed this concern again in
Town of Hallie, stating that there is a "real danger" that a municipality
"will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of
more overriding state goals."' 7 6 This danger will be minimized only by
requiring municipalities to adhere to statewide public policies, the
Court noted. This judicial tendency to eschew reliance on local poli-
cies as a justification for exemption from federal antitrust regulation
has been reflected in lower court decisions as well. 17 7
B. The Immunity of a Public Authority
In addition to the above public policy factors, local governments
must carefully consider the form of entity through which public in-
volvement in private enterprise is undertaken in order to avoid poten-
tial antitrust conflicts. The potential for misstep seems greatest in the
area of creating quasi-public corporations. 7 ' By using public authori-
ties to address state constitutional problems with industrial financing
programs, 179 a local government may well open itself up to antitrust
174. 105 S. Ct. at 1721.
175. 435 U.S. at 408, 412-13, 415-16; see also Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 70-71 (1982).
176. 105 S. Ct. at 1721.
177. "[M]unicipalities might make shortsighted economic decisions that could ben-
efit their constituents but disserve others, and might cause severe economic hardship
outside of the local government boundaries." Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 1025, 1028 (N.D. Tx. 1978); see also In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 474 F. Supp. 1072, 1095-96 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 693 P.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983).
178. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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problems.
State constitutional provisions prohibit lending the credit of the state
to private entities for any purpose. Courts have held that for the credit
of the state to have been loaned, the general taxing power of the sover-
eign must be pledged as security. Among the mechanisms invented to
avoid this constitutional limitation is the public authority. The author-
ity is a quasi-public corporation, apart from the state, that derives its
investment funds from sources other than the general taxing power. In
addition, the primary legal prerequisite for the formation of a public
authority is that it be a separate entity and not a mere appendage of its
creating government. As a result, to the extent that any credit is
loaned to private developers through a public authority, it is not the
credit of the state.
Reliance on the public authority organization, however, results in
exposure to antitrust liability that might not otherwise exist. The 1984
federal legislation, 180 for example, does not exempt the actions of pub-
lic authorities as actions of a local government. Under section 2 of that
statute, "local government" includes both general and special purpose
political subdivisions of the state.18" ' Courts generally hold, however,
that public authorities are quasi-public corporations and do not consti-
tute political subdivisions.' 82 Moreover, the federal statutory scheme
expressly contemplates that exempted local governments have a geo-
graphic element to their make-up, 1 83 an element that can not be attrib-
uted to most public corporations. Section 3 creates immunity for
official conduct of the local government.184 This exemption extends to
local departments, employees, and agents. The committee report ac-
companying the legislation, however, makes clear that this exemption
applies only if the local government either has control over the chal-
lenged actions, or has expressly mandated the actions on the part of a
180. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 34(1).
182. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
183. See, for example, the statutory definition of special purpose political subdivi-
sions. The committee report states: "included within the definition are planning dis-
tricts, water districts, sewer districts, irrigation districts, drainage districts, road districts,
and mosquito control districts." (emphasis added). It goes on to state more explicitly:
"Such a subdivision would have a geographic jurisdiction that is not contiguous with,
and is generally substantially smaller than, that of the State that established it." H.R.
R P. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 4620-21.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a).
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private entity.18 5 Both of these factors are contrary to the legal prereq-
uisites of a public authority's existence."8 6
Additional concern stems from the potential antitrust liability of
public authorities that act in a proprietary as opposed to a governmen-
tal capacity. Federal court decisions finding local antitrust immunity
often turn on how closely the local action resembles the activity of a
private sector player."87 In a variety of circumstances, the stringency
of the Supreme Court requirements placed on entities seeking Parker
state action immunity varies in direct proportion to how closely the
challenged action resembles private sector actions. In California Retail
Liquor Dealers v. Mid-Cal Aluminum ' the Supreme Court held that
a state-sanctioned private price-fixing scheme needed active state su-
pervision to be exempt from federal price-fixing proscriptions."l 9 Simi-
larly, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 90 the Supreme Court denied
state action immunity to a private price-fixing scheme because
although the state sanctioned the process, state policy did not mandate
it.191
Even though an activity may clearly be that of a local government, if
it is in the nature of private action a court will apply a more stringent
antitrust standard. Chief Justice Burger provided the key vote in La-
fayette when he drew this distinction between local activities that are
185. H.R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621.
186. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
187. Lower courts usually depend upon a determination of whether the local gov-
ernment was undertaking a "traditional governmental function." Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1983); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron,
654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated, 455 U.S. 931 (1982); Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v.
City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126 (1983); All
American Cab Co. v. Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Auth., 547 F. Supp. 509, 511
(E.D. Tenn. 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1983). Two district courts based their
decisions on the fact that there was no profit-making activity involved, as in Lafayette.
Cedar-Riverside Assocs. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 1290, 1299 (D. Minn. 1978),
aff'd on other grounds, 606 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1979); Shrader v. Horton, 471 F. Supp.
1236, 1242 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff'd, 626 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1980). One commentator
suggests that the issue of municipal antitrust immunity "may require a resuscitation of
Justice Burger's proprietary-nonproprietary distinction from City of Lafayette." Spie-
gel, Local Governments and the Terror of Antitrust, 69 A.B.A. J. 163, 165 (1983).
188. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
189. Id. at 105-06.
190. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
191. Id. at 789-91.
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proprietary and those that are traditionally governmental. 192 The Sev-
enth Circuit also relied upon this distinction in Town of Hallie.193 In
that decision, the court held that active state supervision of municipal
activities was unnecessary when "a local government perform[s] a
traditional municipal function."' 94 The Supreme Court, in affirming
the Seventh Circuit decision, relied heavily on the difference between
the actions of a private and public entity.' 9 ' The presumption, the
Court said, is that while a private party acts "primarily on his or on its
own behalf," a municipality "acts in the public interest."' 196 The rule
that distinguishes between the governmental and proprietary functions
of local governments can be considered universal.' 97
CONCLUSION
A recent development in government efforts to promote economic
development in response to a variety of social ills is the public provi-
sion of equity funding for private corporations. This type of industrial
assistance is generally funneled through a public or quasi-public corpo-
ration or authority. Equity funding endeavors, particularly those of
local governments, raise a number of legal issues. State constitutional
provisions place restrictions on the grant of public funds for anything
but a public purpose, while banning the loan of public credit in all
circumstances. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions raise the
spectre of possible federal antitrust liability for local governments.
Constitutional restrictions on the use of public monies do not pose
serious obstacles to local venture capital programs. Well-reasoned
court decisions have closely examined claims that a public purpose is
served by economic development arising from industrial inducement
programs similar to venture capital funds. These decisions concentrate
on whether there is a demonstrated need for additional development
192. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 424 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment).
193. 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
194. Id. at 384.
195. 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1720-21 (1985).
196. Id. at 1720; see also State ex rel. Ohio County Comm'n v. Samol, 165 W. Va.
714, 720-29, 275 S.E.2d 2, 5-10 (1980) (Neely, J., concurring).
197. See Department of Treasury v. City of Evansville, 223 Ind. 435, 440-42, 60
N.E.2d 952, 954-55 (1945). The rule applies in a variety of circumstances. For exam-
ple, whether a local government is immune from tort liability on a sovereign immunity
basis may turn on the distinction. Similarly, whether particular property is exempt
from property taxation as governmental often turns on this determination.
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and whether specific economic benefits will arise from the program. As
a general rule, broadly stated economic benefits will not suffice to prove
a public purpose. Any new manufacturing plant, commercial complex,
or retail establishment will result in some benefit. The statement of
benefit by proponents of a particular program must, therefore, be spe-
cific. In addition, new legal inventions which have been incorporated
into venture capital endeavors have eliminated most of the efficacy of
restrictions on lending the credit of the state.
Federal antitrust restrictions pose more significant questions for lo-
cal venture capital funds. Historical limits on public participation in
private enterprise were, in part, based on the anticompetitive impacts
of such participation. The Supreme Court has, in recent years, ex-
panded the potential for local government antitrust liability. In light of
the local as opposed to statewide policies promoted by venture capital
programs, and due to the proprietary nature of these funds, local
policymakers must be extremely cognizant of the anticompetitive im-
pacts of their decisions. Though venture capital funds do not appear to
be per se in violation of federal antitrust statutes, they will not be pro-
tected by recent judicial and legislative protections developed for local
governments.
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